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Cyber Risk Council
Category: Identity & Access Management

Non-Human Identities

Also known as: NHI, Non-Human Identity, Nonhuman Identity, NHIs, Machine Identities
Simply put

Non-human identities (NHIs) are digital identities used by software rather than people, such as applications, services, scripts, bots, and automated processes, to access systems and data. Because these identities operate automatically, they are often created outside normal governance processes and may lack clear ownership. Securing them typically matters as much as securing human user accounts, since they can be misused if left unmanaged.

Formal definition

A non-human identity is a digital identity attached to a machine, application, service, workload, script, device, bot, or AI agent that authenticates and accesses systems, data, or other resources without direct human interaction. NHIs are frequently provisioned by developers or infrastructure teams outside formal identity governance workflows, which often results in unowned, unmanaged credentials that expand the attack surface. Managing NHIs typically involves discovering these identities, assigning ownership, governing their credentials and permissions, and applying controls comparable to those used for human identities in order to reduce credential misuse and support compliance objectives. The specific tooling, governance model, and scope may vary by provider and organizational maturity.

Why it matters

For security leaders, non-human identities represent a governance and risk-management concern rather than a purely technical one. NHIs are often created outside any governance process by developers or infrastructure teams, and in many environments no one owns them at the governance level. This leaves credentials unmanaged and vulnerable to misuse, which expands the attack surface in ways that mirror the risks associated with unmanaged human accounts. Because these identities operate automatically and can accumulate without clear accountability, the exposure they create is easy to overlook until it becomes material.

Securing NHIs is described as critical to reducing the attack surface, preventing misuse of credentials, and maintaining compliance, consistent with the controls applied to human identities. Treating NHI security as an afterthought relative to human identities is a common mistake, as is assuming these identities are already governed simply because they exist within the environment. In practice, they frequently sit outside standard identity governance workflows, which is precisely why deliberate discovery, ownership, and control matter.

The degree of exposure and the value of any NHI security effort typically depend on organizational maturity, stakeholder cooperation, and how completely these identities can be discovered and assigned ownership. Supporting compliance objectives is not the same as guaranteeing certification, and outcomes may vary by provider, scope, and how well developers and infrastructure teams participate in governance.

Who it's relevant to

CISOs and virtual/fractional CISOs
Security leaders setting identity governance strategy can position NHI management as a governance and business-risk function rather than a purely technical tooling problem. A virtual or fractional CISO typically provides strategy, governance, and risk oversight for how non-human identities are discovered, owned, and controlled, and can help align NHI management with broader identity governance and compliance goals. Legal and organizational accountability for identity decisions usually remains with the client organization and its officers unless a contract specifies otherwise.
Identity and access management (IAM) practitioners
IAM practitioners are responsible for extending discovery, ownership assignment, and credential and access governance to non-human identities. Because NHIs are often created outside standard governance processes, practitioners play a central role in bringing them under controls comparable to those used for human identities and in closing the gap where nobody owns these identities at the governance level.
DevOps and infrastructure teams
DevOps and infrastructure teams commonly provision the service accounts, workload identities, and automated credentials that become NHIs. Since these identities are frequently created during development and infrastructure work outside formal governance workflows, the cooperation of these teams is typically essential to assigning ownership and reducing the unmanaged credentials that expand the attack surface.
Security and compliance leaders
Leaders responsible for reducing attack surface and demonstrating control coverage benefit from treating NHI security with the same seriousness as human identity security. The evidence indicates NHI security supports maintaining compliance, though supporting readiness is distinct from guaranteeing certification, and any framework alignment should be confirmed against the organization's specific obligations.

Inside NHI

Service Accounts
Non-human accounts used by applications, services, and automated processes to authenticate to other systems, often provisioned without clear ownership and frequently over-privileged.
API Keys and Tokens
Credentials such as API keys and OAuth tokens that allow software components to authenticate to services, which may be long-lived or hard-coded if not properly managed.
Certificates and Keys
X.509 certificates and SSH keys that establish trust relationships between systems and require lifecycle management, including issuance, rotation, and retirement.
Workload Identities
Machine identities issued to containers, serverless functions, and cloud roles, provisioned programmatically and requiring least-privilege scoping to limit exposure.
Entitlements and Trust Relationships
The access rights and trust connections associated with each NHI that grant it access to data, services, or infrastructure and that expand the attack surface when over-privileged.
Lifecycle Governance
The policies and ownership structures that define how NHIs are created, scoped, rotated, and retired, an area frequently lacking for machine identities.

Common questions

Answers to the questions practitioners most commonly ask about NHI.

Does a virtual CISO directly manage or administer our non-human identities day to day?
Generally no. A virtual CISO typically provides strategy, governance, and risk oversight for how non-human identities such as service accounts, API keys, tokens, and machine credentials are governed. Hands-on operational tasks such as rotating secrets, configuring vaults, or administering identity platforms usually fall outside a vCISO engagement unless explicitly contracted. In many engagements the vCISO defines policy and directs the effort while your internal team or a specialized provider performs the operational work. This distinction matters because conflating a vCISO with a managed service or an identity administration function often leads to unmet expectations about who executes versus who advises.
If we engage a virtual CISO to lead our non-human identity program, do they become accountable for a breach involving a compromised machine credential?
Not typically. A virtual CISO advises on and directs the governance of non-human identities, but legal and organizational accountability for security decisions usually remains with the client organization and its officers. The vCISO can recommend controls, escalate risks, and help prioritize remediation, yet responsibility for approving, funding, and enforcing those measures generally stays with the client. Accountability shifts to a vCISO or their firm only where a contract specifies it. Treating the vCISO as the party that absorbs regulatory or breach liability is a common misconception that experienced buyers should clarify in the engagement terms.
Where does a virtual CISO usually start when addressing non-human identities in an organization?
In many engagements a vCISO begins with governance rather than tooling. That often means establishing an inventory approach, defining ownership for service accounts and machine credentials, and setting policy for how these identities are created, rotated, and retired. The value of this work depends heavily on organizational maturity and the client's ability to provide access to the relevant systems and stakeholders. A vCISO typically frames non-human identity as a business risk and governance issue, not a purely technical one, and prioritizes based on risk exposure rather than attempting to remediate everything at once.
How does a virtual CISO help align our handling of non-human identities with frameworks or standards?
A vCISO can map non-human identity practices to relevant control expectations within frameworks such as NIST CSF, ISO 27001, or SOC 2, and help build readiness toward them. It is important to distinguish supporting readiness from asserting certification: a vCISO engagement typically helps prepare, document, and improve controls, but does not by itself guarantee compliance or a passing audit. The specific framework relevance may vary by provider and by your regulatory environment, so the scope of framework alignment should be defined explicitly at the outset of the engagement.
What determines whether a virtual CISO engagement on non-human identities delivers meaningful results?
Outcomes often depend on factors within the client's control: the maturity of existing identity and access practices, the degree of client cooperation, a clearly defined scope, and the vCISO's access to the right stakeholders and systems. Without visibility into where service accounts and machine credentials exist and who owns them, a vCISO's guidance may remain theoretical. Because a vCISO advises and directs rather than executes operationally, the organization's willingness to act on recommendations is typically a significant driver of the value realized.
Should we expect a virtual CISO to replace our identity or security team for non-human identity work?
No. A common mistake is assuming a vCISO replaces an entire security team. A virtual CISO provides executive-level leadership, strategy, and governance, but the operational work of managing non-human identities generally still requires internal staff or specialized providers. The vCISO typically sets direction, defines policy, and prioritizes risk, while day-to-day administration such as monitoring, tool management, and credential operations sits with other roles unless the engagement explicitly includes them. The engagement complements, rather than substitutes for, operational capacity.

Common misconceptions

A virtual CISO will directly manage and rotate the organization's non-human identities.
A vCISO typically advises on NHI governance, ownership, and policy and directs improvements, while hands-on tasks such as rotating credentials and administering secrets management tooling generally fall to internal operational teams or contracted specialists unless explicitly contracted otherwise.
Non-Human Identities are a purely technical concern outside the CISO's remit.
NHIs are a governance and risk management concern that fits within the strategic advisory scope a vCISO addresses, including establishing ownership, policy, and accountability structures and mapping NHI risk into the broader risk program.
Engaging a vCISO to address NHIs transfers accountability for how those identities are managed.
Legal and organizational accountability for NHI management typically remains with the client organization and its officers; the vCISO provides guidance and direction rather than assuming liability.

Best practices

Establish and maintain an inventory of non-human identities, including service accounts, API keys, tokens, certificates, and machine credentials, before attempting to control them.
Assign clear ownership for each category of NHI so that responsibility for creation, scoping, rotation, and retirement is defined rather than orphaned.
Define and enforce policy for how NHIs are provisioned, scoped to least privilege, and retired, reducing the risk from over-privileged or long-lived credentials.
Map NHI risk into the organization's broader risk register and governance program so it is prioritized alongside other exposures rather than treated in isolation.
Delegate operational execution such as secrets management, credential rotation, and least-privilege enforcement to internal teams or specialist providers while keeping the vCISO in a strategy and oversight role.
Ensure the vCISO has access to relevant stakeholders and system owners, since the effectiveness of NHI governance work depends on organizational maturity, cooperation, and clearly defined scope.